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This Study considers the decline of seagoing jobs in the U. S.
maritime industry. A remedy for this decline proposed by the itiaritime
unions is the civilian contract manning of Navy fleet support and
Military Sealift Cormand (MSC) ships. Whether the Navy utilizes
civilian contract manning will be influenced, in part, by how the Navy
will be able to maintain coimand and control of ships that are crewed
by contract mariners. Questionnaires were provided to maritime trade
and labor organizations to determine how various carmand and control
situations would be handled. The responses to the questionnaires form
the basis for concluding that the inplementation of civilian contract
manning is still too general and uncertain for the Navy to accept.
Recormendations are that the Navy should maintain its present manning
policies of fleet support and MSC ships and continue to require that
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The U. S. itiaritime industry has been experiencing a decline for many
years. Recently, there has been a number of economic difficulties to
deal with: underenployment of ships and mariners, tough cotpetition
fran foreign sources, escalating costs and diminishing revenues, and
significant overcapacity [Ref. 1]. As a result, members of the industry
have been trying to find remedies.
One remedy that is especially appealing to sane of the maritime
unions is to focus their attention on the fleet support ships operated
by the U.S. Na\'y. These ships and the prospect of providing additional
seagoing billets for union mariners have beccme a very tantalizing prize
to be pursued.
The Navy has traditionally manned its fleet support ships with
military personnel. In 1971, the Navy began to operate sane fleet
auxiliaries with Civil Service mariners through the Military Sealift
Ccmnand (MSC) . MSC has a nucleus fleet of 58 ships manned by
approximately 5,500 Civil Service mariners. MSC also has a total of 28
ships that are contract operated and charters 54 merchant ships. The
contract operated and charter ships are manned by conmercial mariners.
Of greater interest, however, are the Navy's 71 fleet si^^port ships that
are manned by 38,500 uniformed sailors.
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B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
As a result of the declining number of seagoing jobs in the
U. S. Merchant Marine, the maritime unions have proposed that the Navy \
utilize civilian contract manning on its fleet support ships, including
those ships currently operated by the MSC and crewed by Civil Service
seamen. The decision to utilize contract manning of these ships will be
partially influenced by how the Navy will be able to coimand and control
the ships vrfien contract crews are aboard. Under current procedures,
selection, training, assignment, and discipline of civilian crews are
controlled by the unions. The Navy is greatly concerned that camiand
and control problons involving civilian contract crews will disrupt the
service that is required of its siopport ships. Several unions, in
rebuttal, have proposed courses of action to eliminate these problems,
but the question is v^ether those proposals are sufficient to convince
the Navy that the comnand and control problems of civilian contract
manning can be eliminated.
C. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
A questionnaire was prepared and forwarded to several maritime trade
and labor organizations to get their reactions to a proposal that
attenpts to eliminate conmand and control problems in contract manning.
The objective of this study is to present those organizations' responses
and to determine if the Navy can or should reconsider its position.
D. CONTENTS
A presentation of the major maritime unions' backgrounds and
histories is included in Chapter II. Chapter III presents the civilian
12

contract manning proposal of the National Marine Engineers' Beneficial
Association (NMEBA) and discusses reasons why this alternative is
desirable. The NMEBA has also provided scms means to eliminate the
cannand and control probleams that such a proposal may create. Qiapter
IV contains the Navy's reasons for opposition to civilian contract
manning of its fleet support ships. Previous studies are surcmarized in
Chapter V. Chapter VI presents the responses of several maritime unions
and trade associations to questions regarding the inplementation of the
proposed solutions to eliminate the canmand and control problems.





II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY
OF MARITIME LABOR UNIONS
The unique characteristic of U. S. maritime unions is their rivalry
with each other. This rivalry is especially depicted in the relations
between the National Maritime Union (NMU) and the Seafarers'
International Union (SIU) , two unions that represent unlicensed seamen.
Their histories can be viewed as a long series of events in which one
union is reacting to the other. The unhappy result is a history of
strikes and job actions and indirect harm to the U. S. maritime
industry. Table 1 shows the development of the major maritime unions.
A. BEGINNING OF MARITIME UNICNIZATION
In the United States, maritime unions date back to 1853 when the
Riggers' and Stevedores' Union Association was organized in San
Francisco. The Association represented skilled riggers until 1919, v^en
it was dissolved and its members found their way into other unions.
There were other early attempts to organize after the Civil War, but
none was successful. In 1866, San Francisco was the site again for the
formation of the Seamen's Friendly Union and Protective Association.
The association attenpted a strike at San Francisco to increase wages,
but it failed.
The first seamen's union fomed that still exists today is the
Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association (MEBA) , organized in 1875 by
engineers employed on ships working the Great Lakes. There were several
other organizations formed that attempted to organize Great Lakes and
Pacific Coast seamen, but these lasted for only a short time.
14

TABLE 1: MARITIME UNION DEVELOPMENT
Coast Seamen's Union; Pacific Steamship
(1885) Sailors' Union (1886)
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On the Pacific Coast, the longshoremen fonned the Longshore
Lumbermen's Protective Association in 1880. It remained a viable
organization until 1900 when it become affiliated with the International
Longshoreanen ' s Association. In 1885, the Coast Seamen's Union was
formed at San Francisco, representing the sailors who sailed the Pacific
Coast in lumber schooners. This union was a forebear of the Sailors'
Union of the Pacific (SUP) , which was fonred in 1891 as the result of a
merger between the Coast Seamen's Union and the Pacific Steamship
Sailors' Union.
The SUP was under the leadership of Mr. Andrew Furuseth, a Norweigan
sailor who became a well-kncwn labor leader for over half a century. He
is credited as the developer of the job action technique which is still
used by unions today and consists of unions signing articles of
shipping, then leaving the ships, and refusing to work. Furuseth was a
fervent trade unionist who believed that the maritime laws in effect
were unfair to seamen. In his opinion, a sailor had no control over his
person or his labor. Consequently, he considered the job action
technique as a tool to make unwilling shipowners meet with the union and
discuss grievances and dannands.
In 1895, the SUP, the Great Lakes Sailors' Union, and the Eastern
and Gulf Sailors' Union were drawn together to form the International
Seamen's Union of America (ISU) . Furuseth served as the ISU's first and
only president until it disintegrated in 1937. The ISU eventually
suffered its demise as a result of the rebellion within it and the
raiding of its membership by more militant industrial unions. Although
the ISU's nembership started with less than 5,000 and grew to more than
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115,000 at its height, its achievements as a national union were
shortlived. After World War I, shipowners refused to deal with the
union and would not sit down to discuss wages or working conditions.
Part of the ISU failure was also due to its structural organization.
The ISU was structured along strictly craft lines by coastal areas, and
its ineinbership belonged to eighteen different autonomous unions. Such
an organization fostered division and suspicion among the various units
and made any united action very difficult.
During World War I, the maritime unions worked very closely with the
United States Shipping Board, v^ch was created by Congress in the
Shipping Act of 1916. The Shipping Board operated all wartiine shipping
and provided enormous leverage that caused ship operators to sign their
first written agreements with the ISU. Immediately after the war, wages
were relatively high and remained so because of the shipping boom
experienced through 1919 as a result of the shortage in tonnage. The
boon lasted until the fall of 1920 when ocean freight rates began to
drop. By the end of 1921, rates had decreased to one-third of what they
were at the height of the boon.
B. MARITIME FEDERATION OF TEffi PACIFIC
The decade of the 1920 's saw the maritime industry in the United
States steadily decline due to a worldwide recession, and labor union
strength declined accordingly. Membership was down due to the shortage
of jcbs, and strikes had no effect on the shipping corpanies.
The errphasis put on organized labor during President Roosevelt's New
Deal caused the formation of the Maritime Federation of the Pacific
(MFP) in 1935. The MFP brought two strong labor leaders together in one
17

organization: Mr. Harry Lundeberg, representing the seagoing unions and
Mr. Harry Bridges, representing longshoremen. Lundeberg and Bridges had
differing philosophies on how labor should exert its power, and these
differences were reflected in how each segment of the Federation
operated. Lundeberg was an advocate of industrial unionism and favored
direct action. He strongly opposed any attenpt to restrict the use of
job action and denounced the concept of demonstrating responsibility.
Bridges, on the other hand, was a trade unionist and believed that the
tactic of job action should be controlled by the Federation and used by
the members only v^en thought to be in the best interests of the Fed-
eration. Bridges wanted to have the appearance of being a responsible
union leader who was reasonable and fair. Although Lundeberg and
Bridges had their strong disagreements in philosophy and tactics, their
members cooperated through the MFP when they had to deal with
shipowners.
C. NATIONAL MARITIME UNION
The ISU suffered during the declining 1920 's but enjoyed a caneback
during the resurgence of unionization in 1934. Prior to this time, the
SUP was taken over by members of the Industrial Workers of the World,
v^ch caused a new and militant leadership to emerge on the West Coast.
As this energing leadership tried to make new gains on the East Coast,
it began to ccme in conflict with the old-line leadership of the ISU.
Shipowners continued to deal with the old leaders rather than see the
militant representatives gain control. This action on the part of the
owners helped to legitimatize the more radical elements and to weaken
the effectiveness of the old-line ISU leadership. The resultant
18

infighting caused the American Federation of Labor (AFL) to call an
election within the ISU. The AFL was tardy in this action, however, due
to its growing conflict with the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO) . As a result, the militancy in the ISU grew to the point that the
ISMJ was established under the leadership of Mr. Joseph Curran in 1937.
Due to the loose organizational control of the ISU and the appealing
philosophy of the NMU, the NMU expanded rapidly vMle the ISU fell
apart.
The NMU, a CIO affiliate, at first had strong Comnunist dcmination.
Its constitution, however, was considered denocratic in that the union
adopted a non-discriminatory policy, resulting in a largely non-v\^te
and Latin membership.
D. SEAFARERS' INIERNATIONAL UNICN
As the NMU began to grow and gain 'membership, the SUP, once an
affiliate of the ISU, felt threatened on the West Coast. To offset the
NMU growth, the AFL issued a charter to the SIU in 1938 under the
leadership of Lundeberg, who still served as secretary of the SUP. The
SIU also had districts on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. Along the Gulf
Coast, the SIU had been preceded by an AFL Seamen's Union that
consolidated any remaining ISU units that were opposed to the political
and racial mix of the NMU. With Lundeberg as the president of the SIU,
the union's philosophy was to favor job action tactics.
E. RIVALRY
Very strong rivalry between the NMU and the SIU thus ensued as the
unions ccmpeted with each other to unionize unlicensed seamen. All
forces present seemed to dictate that the unions would be canpetiters,
19

rivals, and eventually aciversaries . The greatest forces were the
differing philosophies, personalities, and ideologies of the various
leaders and their differences in tactics. The entire organized labor
movement was in turmoil with the AFL and the CIO locked in conflict.
F. COOPEPATION IN WARTIME
During World War II, the NMU and the SIU cooperated with the War
ShJ-pping Administration (WSA) so that there would be no disruption in
shipping due to labor disputes. However, there was still a marked
difference in union attitude regarding the increased role of the Federal
Government. The NMQ cooperated entirely with the WSA and worked for
union participation in decision-making with the Goveinnment. The SIU,
however, was strongly against any Government participation in labor
relations. The SIU severely criticized the NMU for its ccnpliance.
Although the SIU fully supported the war effort, it 'fought against its
members having to carry draft deferment cards or having to take annual
physicals. The SIU feared that the requirement to pass an annual
physical might harm its older members. Any and all attempts of the
Government to becane involved in the union were viewed as attempts to
undermine the union and were opposed.
G. JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
After the war, the U. S. maritime industry was corpletely unionized.
The NMU and SIU were not intent on raiding each other's membership
because increasing membership was no longer the issue. What did became
the issue was the job—v^ch union had jurisdiction over the available
jobs at sea. Another factor adding to this fierce rivalry was that the
20

hiring hall practices of each union resulted in a cotpletely closed
union shop.
The jursidictional dispute situation can be summarized as follows:
Most jurisdictional disputes since the mid-1950 's have followed
a consistent pattern. Every dispute, no matter how cotplex and
multipartied, has been between, and never within, the camps of the
two rivals and their respective allies. Seme of the disputes arise
on the spur of the manent and have not always appeared in the best
interests of one or both of the central figures. However, the fact
that disputes within coalitions either do not occur or do not result
in strikes, and clashes between unions of different loyalties always
result in bitter conflict, can be explained only in terms of an
expanded NMU-SIU rivalry [Ref. 2] .
The rivalry between the ^MJ and SIU spread to the officers' unions
when the SIU formed the Brotherhood of Marine Engineers (BME) to counter
the expansion of the MEBA. MEBA had represented licensed marine
engineers since before the turn of the century and was affiliated with
the CIO. Since the SIU was in the AFL cairp, the formation of the BME
was considered a justifiable act to head off the CIO.
In 1949, MEBA went on strike against a carpany, but the BME crossed
MEBA picket lines and signed on. This same action occurred in 1951 when
the BME again crossed MEBA picket lines. This action forced the MEBA
into an anti-SIU position and, at the same time, closer to the NMU.
The NMU and MEBA also shared a CIO affiliation.
The International Organization of Masters , Mates and Pilots (MMP) ,
the union of deck officers, desired to be removed from the rivalry going
on, but it could be said that there was a slight bit of favoritism for
the NMU. There were two radio operators' unions, one affiliated with
the AFL and the other with the CIO. When the AFL-CIO merged, the
Arrerican Radio Association and the Radio Officers' Union began to
cooperate with each other.
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The closeness of the NMU and MEEA dissolved during the conflict with
the American Coal Shipping Corporation in 1956. The MEBA and the l^MP
established picket lines in the dispute, but the NMU and the Brotherhood
of Marine Officers (BMD) , which was affiliated with the United Mine
Workers, crossed the picket lines to work the struck ships. The result
was that in the ensuing battle, the SIU, MEBA and MMP were on one side
against the NMU and the BMO on the other side. The BMD was subsequently
received into the NMJ and became a subdivision.
The >MP was able to return to an aloof position after the conflict
was resolved, but the MEBA was still firmly entrenched with the SIU .
Because the BME was so available to cross MEBA picket lines, there was
an agreement signed to merge the MEBA with the BME. The BME became a
local of the MEBA v^en the MEBA membership approved the merger in 1959.
In 1961, the MEBA was re-organized into the NMEBA, consisting of three
parts or districts. District 1 included MEBA's Atlantic and Gulf Coast
locals. District 2 was formerly the local made up of the BME. The MEBA
locals on the West Coast became the Pacific Coast District of the NMEBA.
In the years that folloved. District 2 aligned itself with SIU policies.
22

III. UNION PROPOSAL FOR CIVILIAN CCNTBPCT I^^IANNING
OF FLEET SUPPORT SHIPS
A. INTRODUCTICN
The Navy's seventy-one fleet support ships are presently manned by
38,500 uniformed sailors. These seventy-one ships can be categorized by
mission and size.
Category 1 ; 11 station ships, consisting of oilers and combat
support ships. Military crew: 4,900. These ships provide direct
support to combatants and are required to steam with battle fleets.
Category 2 ; 21 shuttle ships, providing ammunition, oil and other
supplies to the station ships and, occasionally, the combatants.
Military crew: 7,200.
Category 3 : 24 major support ships, such as submarine and destroyer
tenders. Military crew: 22,100, consisting mainly of repair
specialists
.
Category 4 : 15 minor suppor-t ships, such as salvage and submarine
rescue ships. Military crew: 1,600.
In addition to these categories of fleet support ships, there is
another category consisting of 58 support ships operated by the MSC.
These ships are cargo ships, tankers. Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force ships,
and scientific support ships. The crews are Civil Service mariners,
numbering 5,500.
As the Navy mans its fleet support ships with military seamen, the
number of seagoing jobs in the maritime industry has declined. The
23

figures in Table 2 shcjw how seagoing employitent of U. S. civilian
inerchant mariners has changed during the period of 1926-1981.
The military billets at sea and the decline in seafaring employment
have not gone unnoticed JDy the maritime unions. Various leaders of the
unions liave argued in favor of cuntract manning for Navy rleet support
ships, Mr. Frank Drozak, President of the SIU and Mr. Thomas iVlartinez,
Secretary-Treasurer of the NMQ testified before the House Committee on
Merchdiit ^iOrine and Fisheries on 3 June 1981. Both leaders were
strongly in favor of an increased private sector role in providing naval
support. Mr. Talmadge Sirtpkins, Executive Director of the Maritime
Carmittee, AFL-CIO in conjunction with Mr. Eugene Spector, Research
Director of the NMQ, suggested in a 22 June 1982 memorandum to MSC that
the Navy replace military manned logistical ships with union hall hires.
This suggestion was proposed by the NMU at a time v^en approximately
5,000 of its members were waiting for shipboard assignment. Mr.
Siirpkins viewed this suggestion as an alternate method of hiring seamen
for MSC billets and as a means of increasing job opportunities for the
unenployed NMQ raeambers.
B. NMEBA POSITION
On 25 April 1983, the president of the NMEBA, Mr. Jesse M. Calhoon,
testified before the House Armed Services Comittee's Subconmittee on
Seapower and Critical Materials. His topic was "Merchant Marine
Coipensation Questions and Measiires to Rebuild the Q. S. Merchant
Marine". Mr. Calhoon requested permission to address the Subcomittee




TABLE 2: SEAFARING EMPLOYMENT, OCEANGOING COMMERCIAL SHIPS;
1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER, 1 JT^NUARY 1926-1981
YEAR CARGO TANKEE^ PASS/COMBO TOTALS
1926 26,350 10,280 20,250 56,880
1931 25,730 10,850 22,350 58,930
1936 22,630 12,170 21,200 56,000
1941 22,380 12,670 13,560 48,610
1946 131,570 29,970 4,010 165,550
1951 28,123 17,712 8,107 53,942
1956 32,482 15,067 8,249 56,329
1961 28,668 12,053 8,560 49,281
1966 32,827 10,985 7,084 50,896
1967 37,620 11,291 7,084 55,995
1968 35,982 10,877 6,207 53,066
1969 32,107 11,094 5,019 48,220
1970 27,985 10,748 3,151 41,884
1971 22,257 10,567 2,178 35,002
1972 17,111 9,372 1,218 27,701
1973 16,346 9,414 1,464 27,224
1974 14,775 9,754 798 25,327
1975 14,234 9,280 798 24,312
1976 12,043 7,598 860 20,501
1977 12,319 7,553 860 20,732
1978 11,870 8,017 860 20,747
1979 11,277 8,840 388 20,505
1980 10,628 8,844 388 19,860




In his testiinony, Mr. Calhoon argued that civilian contract
operation of Navy and MSC fleet support ships was in the national
interest. He presented the following points:
• Navy personnel savings. More than 17,000 Navy personnel could be
freed for assignment elsewhere in the Navy. If the Navy carries out its
plans to build a 600-ship fleet, these personnel can be used to man the
new ships without having to increase recruiting efforts or return to the
draft.
• Strengthened Merchant Marine work force. Civilian contract
manning means an increase of at least 60 percent in the number of
seagoing jobs available. The new jobs will attract young people to the
sea so that a future work force can be formed.
• Inprove productivity. Civilian merchant mariners have more at-sea
experience than their average Navy counterparts and thus can do a better
job with reduced manning.
• Cost savings. Reference is made to several studies that indicate
that contract manning is less expensive than military manning.
• Strengthened Merchant Marine/Navy cooperation. In previous
conflicts, such as World War II, there has been time to construct ships
and train personnel to sail them. There is no guarantee that the next
conflict will provide sufficient lead time to get ready. Civilian
contract manning is the best way to increase the number of merchant
seamen who are trained and ready to serve with the Navy.
C. CIVILIAN CONTRACT MANNING PROPOSAL
In his testimony, Mr. Calhoon presented proposals and supporting
arguments similar to those presented in an article in the Third Quarter
26

1982 issue of the Defense Management Journal . The article, entitled
"Naval Support Ships: The Case for Civilian Manning," was written by
Mr. David A. Leff, executive director of the Joint Maritime Congress
(JMC) , and Mr. Thonas W. Scoville, director of policy and planning, also
of the JMC. ^- ^.'^
This civilian contract manning proposal involves turning over all
four of the above categories of naval ships to civilian contract
operation. Exceptions to this proposal can be made in the case of
certain specialized and strictly military missions that must be
performed by Government personnel. Shipping corpanies are responsible
for connercial operation and engage in coipetitive negotiations to
contract. The ships' masters are arployees of the cotipanies but are
under the operational direction of designated Government officials. The
crews are members of the maritime unions.
The success of the proposal depends on the existence of Navy cormand
and control of the civilian contract manned ships. As fleet support
ships, there must be responsiveness to Navy requirements. To ensure
effective camand and control, the proposal includes the following
points:
(1) Contract operated or crewed support ships would remain under
direct Navy and MSC operational control. Although the masters and the
crews are civilian, they are subject to the directives and orders of the
fleet coTinanders to whan fleet support is provided.
(2) Contract crewmembers would be formed into a special pool (as
distinct fran normal union hiring halls) that would be available for
service, trained in fleet support work, and security-cleared where
27

required. The issue is v^ether or not a contract crew is capable of
conducting naval support activities as well as military or Civil Service
crews. In sane job areas, such as stewards or engineers, there may be
no difference in capability. In seme operations, such as
replenishment-at-sea, contract crews are presently not as proficient.
Training and practice can equip them with the necessary skills and
experience. The training can be conducted at union-run schools with the
Navy providing the technical input. Availability can be assured by each
union maintaining a pool of these specially trained seamen to ensure
that they are trained, properly cleared for security, and prepared to
serve on fleet support ships.
(3) The unions involved would agree to binding no-strike
guarantees. The Navy's ships cannot be immobilized due to a strike or
any other job action. This possibility can be eliminated by an ironclad
no-strike agreement with the unions.
(4) Contract crewmembers could agree to becane members of the
Navy's active reserve, available for inmediate call-up. This provision
strengthens the responsiveness of the crew to military caimands.
(5) Where required for particularly sensitive military operations,
a Navy officer could be the ship's captain. Such operations may include
underway replenishment in battle or intelligence gathering. In these
special situations, the civilian master is replaced by a naval officer
vdio is eligible for ccninand at sea.
(6) Where required, contract manned ships could have a military
detachment on board for defense or connunications . The detachment can
also assure smooth interaction with Navy canbatants.
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There are costs savings associated with the contract manning
proposal. The NMEBA position is that Navy military manning is the most
expensive mode of operation. There is considerable controversy,
however, over \4iich mode of civilian operation is the most econcmical:
contract or Civil Service. Since the controversy steins from the
identification and calculation of the costs involved and is beyond the
scope of this thesis, the cost issue will not be addressed.
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IV. NAVY POSITION ON CIVILIAN CONTRACT MANNING PROPOSAL
The Navy objects to civilian contract inanning of its fleet support
ships for three major reasons:
A. Cost;
B. Potential for disruption of operations; and
C. Loss of connand and control.
These reasons were discussed by the Navy in answers submitted to
questions raised by the House of Representatives Conmittee on iMerchant
Marine and Fisheries in hearings conducted in July 1981.
A. COST
The Navy claims that cost coiparison studies have shown that the use
of contract manning is 20 percent more expensive than Civil Service
personnel. Table 3 is a cotparison of four specific ratings showing the
difference in pay for a point-to-point tanker without overtime or
premium/penalty pay.
Overtime, premium, and penalty pays are influenced by type of ship
and mission. If these pays were included, however, the cost difference
would be greater. Overtime on Civil Service operated point-to-point
tankers ranges fron 75 to 90 percent of base pay. Overtime on contract
operated tankers for MSC ranges fron 120 to 140 percent of base pay.
Since the higher rates for contract operated tankers are applied to
higher base rates, the cost ia overtime with contract operation is
considerably greater than with Civil Service operation.
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TABLE 3: ANNUAL COST BY RATING—BASE PAY AND FRINGE
BENEFITS—SEALIFT TANKER BASED CM PAY RATES








CONTRACT OPERATION $188,863 $87,736
MSC CILIVIAN MARINERS 73,012 38,480
DIFFERENCE $115,851 $49,256
Source: DoD Testimony in Hearings before House Comnittee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, July 1981, page 151
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B. POTENTIAL FOR DISRUPTION OF OPERATION
When dealing with union crews, there is always a strong potential
for disruption of service. This disadvantage encorrpasses more than just
the threat of strike. There has been a number of legal battles when
contracts have been let to operators with different union affiliations.
In each of these cases, the unions affiliated with the previous
operators have attenpted to upset the procurement action. MSC action
was upheld in each case.
1. Contract Disputes
A review of the decisions of the Ccraptroller General of the
United States (CQMPGEN) provides the details to several of these
disputes
.
a. The MSC issued a request for proposals (RFP) to operate
thirteen Navy tankers for five years beginning 1 Nbvenber 1972. Eight
proposals were received and examined by an evaluation board. Two of the
offerors did not have the minimum experience in tanker operations
required by the RFP and were not given any further consideration. The
remaining six offerors were requested by telegram on 21 Septanber 1972
to submit projections of their yearly expenses in terms of wages, both
regular and overtime, payroll taxes, and siabsistence . Based on the data
submitted, MSC contracting personnel prepared a five-year projection of
the costs of operation for each of the offerors. Hudson Waterways
Corporation, affiliated with the SIU, was found to be the ccmpany with
the lavest projected costs. Two other offerors, also affiliated with
SIU, had the second and third lowest projected costs. Mathiasen,
affiliated with the NMU, had the fourth lowest projection.
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The coipany with the fifth lowest projection of costs was also affili-
ated with the NMU. The evaluation board reconmended that the award of
the contract be made to Hudson, and a notice of award was for^^arded to
Hudson on 2 October 1972. The bMJ protested the award to the CCMPGEN
and filed a petition in the District Court for the District of Columbia
on 9 Noveanber 1972 for a preliminary injunction to restrain MSC from
further action until the CCMPGEN ruled on the protest. The District
Court denied the motion for an injunction on 21 November 1972 (National
Maritime Unions of America, AFL-CIO v. John W. Warner, et al. , USDC,
D.C., D.A. No. 2236-72). The CCMPGEN reviewed the circumstances of the
solicitation proceedings and considered NMU's protest that the award to
Hudson was invalid. The CCMPGEN found that the MSC followed all
procurement statutes and regulations by utilizing corpetitive proce-
dures. NMU's protest was denied, and the decision was released on 30
April 1973.
b. On 19 December 1973, a RFP was issued to operate MSC's fleet
of nine tankers for a period of five years with consecutive tv^o-year
options totaling 23 years. In addition to the standard requirements,
the RFP also required that offerors have had recent satisfactory''
experience in the operation of either Govemment-cvnied tankers under
contract with the Navy or a fleet of privately-owned tankers of T-2 size
or larger of which at least two must have been United States flag. Five
proposals were received, and it was determined that Iran Destiny
Carriers, Inc., had sufcndtted the lowest offer. At the request of the
contracting officer, a preaward survey was performed on Iran by the
Defense Contract Administration Services Region, New York and by the
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Defense Contract Audit Agency, New York. It was concluded that Iran
lacked the financial capability to perform the contract. Iran's recent
perfonnance of its tankers was subsequently evaluated. On the basis of
that evaluation, the contracting officer on 29 March 1974 determined
Iran not to be responsible. The determination was brought to the
attention of the Small Business Administration (SBA) . Iran had
certified itself as a small business, and the SBA becaire involved with
Iran's filing of an application for a certificate of competency. On 22
i^ril 1974, the SBA formally appealed the iMSC determination of
nonresponsibility, but the appeal was denied and the decision of the
contracting officer was affirmed. Award of the contract was then made
to the next low offeror, I«1arine Transport Lines, Inc. Shortly after the
award, the president of MEBA, District 2, protested the
nonresponsibility determination on Iran which was affiliated with the
union. In its protest to the COyiPGEN, MEBA attempted to respond to
MSC's reasons for determining Iran not responsible. Upon review of the
circumstances of the case and the governing principles, the CQMPGEN
concluded that the record was sufficient to substantiate the MSC
determination. The protest was denied, and the decision was released on
27 November 1974.
c. MSC decided to exercise its option under the contract with
Marine Transport Lines to allow for the continued operation of nine oil
tankers. MEBA, District 2 and the SIU protested the exercise of the
first option to the CCMPGEN. The CGMPGEN reviewed the circumstances of
the contract award and considered v^iether the MEBA and the SIU were
interested parties. The CQMPGEN concluded that MEBA and SIU were not
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and dismissed the protest. The decision was released on 5 December
1980. Injunctive relief was also sought but was denied (District 2,
iMEBA V. MSC, USDC D.C. , CA, No. 79-1173).
2. Job Actions
There have been recent incidents of job actions that have
resulted in disrupted operations.
a. On 18 June 1981, SS TRANSCOLORADO (TC) experienced a labor
dispute vihile in port at New Orleans, Louisiana. The ship, a dry cargo
vessel specially modified for a heavy lift capability, was
time-chartered to MSC by Hudson Waterways Corporation. The dispute
involved the I-lasters, Mates and Pilots (MMP) , the American Radio
Association (ARA) , the International Longshoremen Association (ILA) , and
District 2, MEBA-Associated Maritime Officers (AMO) . Hudson's contract
with the MMP and the ARA expired on 16 June. Because of financial
difficulties, Hudson notified the unions that it contemplated
terminating its shipping operations. On 15 June, Hudson hand-delivered
a letter to the unions, informing them that Point Shipping Corporation
of New York had agreed to assume the operational responsibilities of the
Hudson ships, one of which was the TC in New Orleans. The MMP sought
Qtiergency arbitration on 15 June, the day before its contract expired,
but achieved no action. At Point Shipping's request, District 2,
MEBA-AMO supplied licensed deck, engine, and radio officers to those
ships previously under Hudson's control. The MMP irembers of the TC
refused to leave, and the ARA began to picket the TC. As a result, the
ILA refused to cross the ARA picket line to work the TC. The TC was
ordered to depart N^v Orleans on 25 June but was unable to do so because
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the pilot refused to cross tlie ARA picket line. The services of an
independent pilot were obtained on 26 June, and the TC set sail for
Norfolk, Virginia. The labor dispute on board was still unresolved.
The TC arrived in Norfolk on 29 June. Three ILA gangs had been
ordered, but none showed up, refusing to cross ARA picket lines outside
the gate of the naval station. MSC's plan was to offload the TC with
Civil Service personnel on 22 July and place it in reduced operational
status (ROS) at the Military Ocean Terminal in Bayonne, New Jersey. The
RDS was changed the next day wtien MSC Headquarters ordered the ship to
sail in ballast to Bremerhaven , Germany via Charleston, South Carolina.
Upon arriving in Charleston on 31 July, picket lines were in place at
the terminal gate. ILA refused to work the ship. MSC continued efforts
to load Charleston cargo, but the longshoremen continued to honor the
ARA picket lines. The TC scheduled sailing for 2 August was cancelled.
The dispute prevented any further loading in Charleston, so the TC
departed for Bayonne where MSC placed the ship in ROS on 8 August. The
labor problons were reported resolved on 29 September. MSC returned the
TC to full operational status on 2 October v\^en it conmenced loading at
Bayonne for its voyage to Bremerhaven via Charleston. The TC had been
out of use since 18 June.
b. On 26 August 1981, the Sea Land Marine Terminal in Seattle,
Washington was closed as a result of picketing action by the MMP. The
J^IP was attenpting to organize shore-side administrative personnel at
Sea Land. MSC reported that the SS NEWARK had to delay its departure
from Seattle because loading was interrupted by the labor dispute. Sea
Land requested a temporary restraining order to remove pickets so that
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loading could be corpleted. On 27 August, Sea Land was able to get a
restraining order in Seattle. Pickets departed, and the NEWARK sailed
on the same day. Sea Land had also requested a restraining order from a
San Francisco court so that SL DEVELOPER and SL FINANCE, currently at
Oakland, California, could be free to sail. Sea Land was unable to
obtain the restraining order, so the DEVELOPER and the FINANCE were
prevented fron sailing. Meanwhile, SL LIBERATOR arrived in Long Beach,
California on 27 August, and work was resumed in that port v^en pickets
were withdrawn. At this time, MSC began to identify alternative lift
capabilities. On 1 September, all reefer cargo in Oakland had been
removed as a result of re-bookings. Agreement was reached between the
coipany and the union on 2 September. SL DEVELOPER was scheduled to
depart Oakland on 2 September, and SL FINANCE was scheduled to depart on
4 September. Picket lines had been thrown up in Seattle, Oakland, and
Long Beach. The pickets in Seattle required a tenporary restraining
order to remove them, but no such action occurred in Oakland. Instead,
two ships were unable to sail and alternate lift means had be to
arranged. There was no disruption in Long Beach.
c. On 1 September 1981, the Inland Boatmen's Union (IBU) v/ent
out on strike against Dillingham Tug and Barge Ccmpany, the principal
interisland barge service to all major Hawaiian Islands and tug operator
for arriving and departing Matson and U. S. Lines Ships in Honolulu
harbor. Management personnel were used to operate the tugs and barges
but at a reduced rate of only 35 percent. On 5 September, cargo
bookings were accepted on a priority basis as the conpany continued to
operate at 35 to 40 percent of normal. However, there was Government
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cargo that could not be itioved due to the reduced operations. By 9
Septeanber, all military cargo was moving, including sane vehicles. Sane
cargo had been diverted to air shipments. The corpany and the union
reached an agreement on 9 September.
C. LOSS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
Fleet support ships must be under direct management control of the
Navy in order to provide sufficient flexibility to meet fleet require-
ments. Civilian contract manning does not allow this direct management
control. Civil Service manning, on the other hand, allows the Navy to
have sole control of qualification requirements, manning scales,
selection and assignment, and discipline.
There are contract difficulties in the provision of these support
services for vdiich no resolution is forthcardng. Present law prohibits
personal ser'/ices contracts. No Government official can "be put in
charge of non-GDvemment arployees and be expected to supervise their
work. Other difficulties include establishing and administering
maintenance standards and susceptability of an award to attack by
unsuccessful offerors.
The hearings before the House Camdttee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries of 23 July 1981 presented the following points in favor of
Civil Service manning:
(1) Civil Service mariners are subject to uniform Navy control
through MSC Area Cormanders and are disciplined exclusively by MSC.
Under contract operations, control is indirect. The crew is employed by
a shipping catpany, and MSC must deal with the corpany.
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(2) Personnel regulations are developed and issued by the Navy.
Under contract operations, most pertinent regulations are Coast Guard,
and others are contained in union/manageinent contracts.
(3) MSC has cotplete control in crew selection and assigninent
,
subject to veterans preference and Civil Service procedures. They have
had extensive damage control and specialized missions. They have much
more experience in ships with specialized missions. Under an operating
contract, contractors obtain crews frcm union hiring halls. Referrals
frcm the union are based on possession of appropriate USCG documents,
seniority groupings, and time on the beach. Union referrals to shipping
ccttpanies range from marginal to superior, but corpanies have no 'choice.
(4) MSC crews are more stable in that they can be continuously
assigned to the same ship or type ships, subject to relief for vacation
purposes. Under ccnxnercial contract manning, mariners sign Shipping
Articles for a specific ship and voyage. They may or may not elect to
sign for the next voyage. Sane unions preclude their doing so, if
atteipts are being made to share the work. These mariners owe their
loyalty to the unions which place them in the job, and secondly to the
corpanies which hire them.
D. SUMMARY
Although civilian contract manning would free military personnel for
other uses, the Navy still considers such civilian manning to be
unreliable because of lessened management control. No rationale has
been established to support any benefit that may be gained by shifting




The prospect of civilian contract manning of fleet support ships is
not a n€M topic. It h^s been the subject of many studies, several of
which are sunmarized below.
A. INVESTIGATIOJ OF THE POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED USE OF CIVILIAN
MANNING IN FLEET SUPPORT SHIPS (CIVMZ\N) , MARCH 1978
This study was conducted by Infoinriation Spectrum, Inc., Arlington,
Virginia at the request of the Chief of Naval Operations when there
existed the strong potential for a future military manpower shortage.
The study was one of several initiatives conducted by the Navy to
examine the supply-demand problem in total force manpower management.
The study examined the costs, risks, capabilities, and benefits of
manning Navy fleet support ships, alternatively, with Navy military
personnel. Navy Civil Service mariners, and ccmmercial contract
mariners. Ninety-five fleet support ships were considered, using the
three manning alternatives to evaluate certain factors such as operating
policy, manpower requirements and costs, and risks to the Navy. The
stiidy findings are shewn in Table 4. Regarding carmand and control of a
civilian crew, it was found that both forms of civilian nonning
presented a risk to the Navy. The study sunmarized the risks as
follows:
(1) Reduced military control in civilian-crewed ships;
(2) Legislation required to deal with personal services contracting
under contract manning; and
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TABLE 4: PROS AND COIS OF THE THREE MANNING ALTERNATIVES
PROS COIS
Military Manning
• Direct fleet chain of carmand.
• Largest crew for damage control/
survivability/product delivery.
• Direct line of military ccmnand.
• Provides canmand and training
billets
.













Peacetime ship utilization higher.
Corrpatible with peacetiine
mission o] fleet
• Reduced operational control.
• No defense capability.
• Lo/er survivability due to
fewer on-board personnel.
• Loss of Navy caimand and
training billets.
• Potential endiirance problems
during a war/contingency.
• Eventual loss of most Navy
Military Manned fleet support
skills.
Conmercial Contract Manning
• Cost lav^er than Navy Military
manning.
• Releases military personnel
to conbat roles.
• Peacetime ship utilization higher.
• Supports the private sector of
the econcmy.
• Potential political support fron
the private sector.
• Ccmpatible with peacetime
mission of fleet.




Lower survivability due to
fewer on-board personnel.
Limited control over crew
selection.
Loss of Navy ccannand and
training billets.
Minor contractual/ legislative
problems need to be overcone.
Potential endurance problems
during a war/contingency.
Eventual loss of most Navy





(3) Potential strike threat or other job actions could disrupt
service unless a no-strike agreement is secured.
Overall, camiercial contract manning resulted in costs higher than
Navy Civil Service manning, the least operational control, and limited
control over crew selection.
B. A TOTAL FORCE MANPOWER ALTERNATIVE—CIVILIAN SUBSTITUTICN AT SEA,
JUNE 1979
This study was conducted by Cairnander Steven E. Fabry, Supply Corps,
U. S. Navy, through the Center for Advanced Research at the Naval War
College, Newport, Rhode Island. The purpose of the study was to examine
the proposal • of ertploying civilians , either Civil Service mariners or
contractor employees, aboard Navy conbat and fleet support ships. The
projected manpower shortfall of the 1980 's and 1990 's, the deficit of
Navy petty officers, and increasing costs of training caused the study
to be conducted. The civilians would perform certain duties in areas
where there were inadequate numbers of Navy military personnel. The
study also looked at the problems that would be experienced with this
proposal. It presented precedents for civilians afloat and in conbat
and discussed the administration of discipline. The study noted that
contractual solutions to disciplinary infractions, habitability aboard
ships, strike clauses, a ccnibat zone bonus, and conduct standards aboard
Navy vessels need further clarification.
C. CIVILIAN CCNTRACT OPERATICN OF GOVERNMENT SHIPS, DECEMBER 1981
This study was conducted by Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc., for the
Joint Maritime Congress to examine the potential for civilian contract
operation of Government-owned ships operated by the Navy and the MSC,
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among others. Seventy-one Navy fleet support ships and sixty-one MSC
ships were considered for conversion to contract manning to determine
the degree of conversion flexibility and the irnpact of such conversion.
The study concluded that using contract manning on Navy Fleet auxil-
iaries and MSC ships would provide more benefits than losses. The study
also pointed out that v*iile contract manning could maintain effective
performance of Governmental missions, it would require sane changes in
current connercial practices. Exanples of such changes are:
(1) Dedicated pools of merchant mariners for each Government-type
ship to ensure crew continuity;
(2) Specialized training so that fleet support work could be done
by coiroercial mariners;
(3) Direct operational control by Goveinment officials; and
(4) Work practices and freedon to strike.
These changes were identified, but the study did not provide any
description or discussion of how the unions and conpanies would effect
these changes.
D. FINAL REPORT CIVILIAN MANNING OF AE, AFS, AND AD TYPE SUPPORT
SHIPS, APRIL 1983
This study was prepared by Information Spectrum, Inc. , Arlington,
Virginia for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) . The study considered the
AE-26 (amminition) , AFS-1 (cottiat stores) , and AD-37 (destroyer tender)
classes of Navy auxiliary ships when manned with Navy military, Itevy
Civil Service, and coimercial contract mariners. The three modes of
manning on the three classes of ships were analyzed on the basis of
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manpcwer requirements, mission capabilities, operational iirpacts, and
costs. In the discussion of current commercial contract operations, the
study noted that one issue was the disciplinary control which could be
exercised over Navy Civil Service and ccannercial contract seamen aboard
fleet support ships during peacetime, contingency, or wartime. Such
disciplinary control might not be as direct corpared to Navy military or
Civil Seirvice personnel, but the study indicated that this issue might
be an area for contractiial negotiations and remedies.
E. SUMMARY
Previous studies have examined the prospect of civilian crews on
Navy ships. While the studies have concluded that the concept of
civilian manning is probably workable, there are risks involving reduced
ccjimand and control and potential for strikes or other job actions.
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VI. QUESTIONNAIRES AND RESPONSES
A. INTRODUCTIOJ
Through Congressional testimony and various publications, maritiine
unions have reported that they would cooperate with the Navy in the
iirplesTvsntation of civilian contract manning of fleet support ships.
However, there are questions about how the proposal would be inplemented
by the unions. Therefore, a questionnaire was prepared to ask specific
questions about how the proposal for civilian contract manning would be
inplemented.
The selection of maritime unions to be sent the questionnaire was
done on the basis of the size and makeup of membership. Each union is
connected with a maritime trade association whose purpose it is to
conduct studies, review pertinent maritime legislation, and provide
research service to the union. The unions selected to receive the
questionnaire and their corresponding associations are:
UNIONS TRADE/LABOR ORGANIZATION
Marine Engineer's Beneficial Joint Maritime Congress (JMC)
Association (MEBA) , represents Washington, D.C.
deck, engine, and radio
officers. Approximate member-
ship: 11,700
Masters, Mates and Pilots (MMP) Maritime Institute of Research
represents deck officers. and Industrial Development
Approxiinate membership: 10,000 (MIRAID) Washington, D.C.
Seafarers' International Union Transportation Institute
(SIU) , represents unlicensed Washington, D.C.
seamen, (deck, engine and




National Maritime Union (NMU) AFL-CIO Maritime Carmittee
represents unlicensed seainen Washington, D.C.
(deck, engine and stewards)
.
Approximate membership: 20,000
A second questionnaire was prepared to be sent to several shippiiig
organizations to determine their reactions to the civilian contract
manning proposal. Organizations with wide representations were selected
to receive the questionnaire. The three shipping organizations cure:
Council of American-Flag Ship Operators (CASO)
Washington, D.C.
American Institute of Merchant Shipping (AIMS)
Washington, D.C.
Maritime Service Coirmittee
New York, New York
A draft questionnaire identified the proposal as ccming from Mr.
Calhoon's testimony. Prior to sending the questionnaire to the unions,
telephone contact was made to lay the foundation for the receipt of the
questionnaire in the mail. During the call to the Joint Maritime
Congress, it was suggested by Mr. Scoville of that organization that the
questionnaire would no doubt be better received by other organizations
if mention of Mr. Calhoon was deleted. The deletion was made as
suggested.
The questionnaire presented the proposal to use civilian contract
manning on all Navy fleet support ships, including MSC ships. For the
labor organizations, a questionnaire consisting of eleven questions was
developed. The main areas covered by the questions dealt with the
special pool of trained personnel, hiring hall changes, strikes and job
actions, and discipline. In the case of the shipping organizations, a
questionnaire of six questions was developed. The questions intended to
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get reactions to the propositions of (a) a ship's captain working
directly for the Navy, (b) no strikes or job actions, and (c) owning or
leasing Navy ships for fleet support operations. The questionnaires and
cover letters are found in i^pendix A.
B. PESPCNSES FROM LABOR OPGANIZM-ION
Four labor organizations were requested to participate in the
survey. Two written responses were received.
1. Joint Maritime Congress
The responses to the questionnaire were prepared by Mr. Thomas
W. Scoville, the director of policy and planning. He aiphasized in his
cover letter, contained in Appendix B, that the answers can be con-
sidered as caning frcm Mr. Calhoon of NMEBA.
Q: What is your organization's overall reaction to the
proposal?
A: We enthusiastically support it.
Q: What is your reaction to the concept of a special pool
of union members, available for and trained in fleet
support work and cleared for security reasons?
A: We believe that the use of this device would ensure
operational responsiveness and operational control—two
iirperatives for the Navy v\^ch we believe are essential.
The purpose of fleet support in the first place is to
support the Navy; therefore, any plan must be consistent
with national security. This is the overriding criterion.
Q: Hew would union members be selected for seirvice in
this special pool?
A: We believe that this should be worked out in
cooperation with the Navy. The standards set must be
high. Navy and union representatives should meet to agree
on such criteria as physical standards, training
(including specialized training that may be necessitated
by fleet support role) , age, availability, etc. Union
members that meet these agreed standards would then be
permitted and encouraged to join the pool.
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Q: Hc3W would this selection process inpact on current
union hiring hall rules?
A: There would be no iirpact. We already have ccmpanies
that do not hire through union hiring halls, but instead
the hiring is negotiated with individual catpanies.
CIVMAN could be accarplished in this manner.
Q: What specific procedures would be adopted in union
hiring hall to accontiDdate this special pool?
A: See the response to (the above) question. . . Union
hiring hall rules need not enter into the picture if a
specific collective bargaining contract is used.
Q: Do you believe that unions would be able to ensure
crew continuity? If so, please be specific in describing
how this continuity would be accarplished.
A: Crew continuity is not a problem in the merchant
marine today; indeed, many officers and specialists work
the same ship voyage after voyage. For example, at
present two U. S. Lines ships, the SS AMERICAN RAPID and
the SS AiXERICAN ROVER, under long-term charter to the MSC
to carry military cargo, are being sold to Central Gulf.
Although the ownership is changing, the same MEBA crews
will man the ships. This provides an excellent sanple of
the type of crew continuity that is already practical and
that can be easily achieved if CIVMAN is inplemented.
Additionally, the special CIVMAN labor pool will be big
enough to ensure continuity to trained personnel. One
should note that the Navy faces a similar problem with its
personnel and still manages to ensure continuity.
Q: Hew would union guarantee no-strikes or job actions?
A: No-strike and no job action would be guaranteed by
signed contract. It should be noted that the seagoing
unions have never struck a conmercial ship loaded with
military cargo. For exanple, during the last maritime
strike in 1965, special provisions were made so that ships
carrying military cargo were not affected.
Q: What action is seen if a particular imion must give up
crewing a ship due to a contract re-negotiation?
A: This happens often during cormercial operations and
does not generate strikes or job actions. No disruptive
action is foreseen; besides, if necessary, provisions to




Q: Would union honor shoreside picket lines in ports?
A: This union would honor its contract. Its record in
this regard is excellent.
Q: Hew would disciplinary problems, such as on-duty and
off-duty misconduct, be handled?
A: Disciplinary problems would be handled the same as
they are with today's merchant fleet—with very strict
rules regarding infractions of discipline. Today, for
exairple, the penalty for possessing one marijuana
cigarette at sea is forfeiture of seainens' papers and with
it loss of the sailor's right to go to sea. One can, as
well, be docked 32 days pay for being late to work.
Q: Would your reaction to this proposal changes as a
result of peacetime, contingency, or wartime conditions?
A: No. In fact, we believe that this proposal will
enhance our maritime capabilities by broadening the
support and mobilization base available to the Navy.
2. AFL-CIO f^aritirrg Cairnittee
The questionnaire was not directly addressed by Mr. Talmadge E.
Sinpkins, executive director of this organization. He did provide,
hcwever, a copy of his statement before the Subcannittee on Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials of the House Armed Service Comittee.
His cover letter is contained in Appendix B. He cornvsnted that his
statement addressed the issues raised in the questionnaire. A portion
of that statement is presented:
At present the military is almost exclusively the only
source of new business to the (maritime) industry. The
DoD through the MSC can either operate ships in-house with
Civil Service crews or it can contract with a private
operator to perform the function. Currently, MSC has a
"Request for Proposals" out to operate two C-3s by a
cormercial operator. These ships are at present operated
by MSC with Civil Service crews. We await the results,
particularly the comparative costing between the use of
union and Civil Service crews, with great interest.
The NMU is prepared to develop collective agreements
goveiming operations for the military that would be
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conpetitive or cheaper than Civil Service operations.
However, MSC costs should reflect the real world and be
fair and equitable. We firmly believe the current costing
of fringe benefits such as time off, pension, welfare,
training, payroll taxes, etc., are unfairly loaded in
favor of Civil Service operations.
The NMU, in concert with the Seafarers International
Union of North America, AFL-CIO, has proposed the
establishment of a system or procedure whereby the Navy
and/or the Military Sealift Cotmand would hire unlicensed
seamen directly fran the union hiring halls.
The general concept of manning a number of the Navy's
nonccmbatant refueling tankers, supply vessels and special
projects ships (these ships are currently manned by Navy
blue jacket seamen) with private civilian merchant
mariners has been discussed in and out of Government for
the past twelve years
. . . there have been private nongoveimment studies
conducted. To our knowledge all of these studies have
demonstrated that the private civilian manning concept is
feasible and practical .
The specific proposal that the NMU and SIU have made
pertains to unlicensed seamen only.
This concept is not new because it has worked with
another government agency for the past forty-five years.
The unlicensed seamen who manned the ships of the Panama
Line of the Panama Railroad Company and its successor
agencies were hired directly from the NMU hiring hall.
This practice was followed fron the mid-thirties until the
last ship was laid ^p in 1981. These agencies agreed to
pay the wages and fringes, including pension and welfare
contributions, as they were established by the NMU and the
private cotpanies. These agencies, instead of signing an
agreofnsnt with the union vdiich they contended they could
not do, would by letter notify the NMU of their intentions
to pay the wages and fringes as established.
For reasons vdiich have not been totally explained, the
Administration's objective of expanded utilization of the
private maritime personnel concept has not been adopted by
the Navy.
Vfe are, however, continuing in this effort. Most
recently, it has been suggested to us by Navy that the
mariners who would be enployed in the manner we suggest
would have to be Civil Service enployees and that their
fringe benefits would be covered by applicable Civil
Service laws and that it would take special legislation to
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enable Navy to contribute to union pension and welfare
funds. The conclusion is then drawn—"As a consequence,
it appears that your proposal could not be put to
practical application.
"
It is our belief that the Navy is opposed to the
private manning concept because of misconceptions
pertaining to the following:
1. Cost.
2. Potential disruption of service because of union
actions
.
3. The seamen would not work directly for the Ccmnand
and, therefore, the Carmand would not have direct
control
4. The cormercial operators do not have an
understanding of the corplexities of the logistical
support activities.
5. Seamen in private industry do not possess the
necessary skills needed in the support activities.
6. When crews are assigned from the hiring halls,
there is no continuity of crew.
We believe that an open-minded fair appraisal of our
proposal would answer these misconceptions:
The two unions have suggested that they would agree,
as a part of the proposal, to:
—the establishment of an adequate training program;
—a system which would provide for continuity of crew;
—security clearances for the crew and the issuance of
"special" papers for shipping on Navy vessels;
—the application of health standards;
—discuss the application of the Jones Act and/or the




All studies on this concept which we are aware of have
projected a cost savings. We have offered to sit down
with the Navy's finance and operation people and
demonstrate to them v^ere and the amount of the cost
savings. Our proposal applies to "unlicensed" seamen
only. We are proposing that most of the provisions in the
private industry NMU/SIU collective bargaining
agreonent—including pension and welfare
contributions—could be put into effect without the
Government being a signatory to a collective bargaining
contract. This was the procedure followed by the Panama
Canal agencies for over forty years. The agencies would,
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by letter, inform the NMO that they would honor the
applicable NMU industry-wide collective bargaining
agreement.
Section 202 (8) of the Classification Act mandates
that government seamen shall be paid in accordance with
the private industry. Therefore, the wages of the
unlicensed seamen in the private industry and those
enployed on the government-owned ships in the Civil
Service group are very similar.
The NMU/SIU would negotiate a contract with the MSC
which would fit the needs of both the Comiand and the
members of NMU/SIU.
DISRUPIION OF SERVICE
NMHJ/SIU recognizes that labor stability is a necessity
in any military operation and would sign a "no-strike"
agreement with the operating agency.
CC^miOL OF SEAMEN
The current practice of enploying private industry
seamen through the issuance of RFP's and private operating
ccnpanies does create the sitiiation where the seamen are
technically atployed by the corpanies rather than MSC.
•
The NMU/SIU is proposing that MSC employs its seamen
directly frcm the hiring halls of the NMU/SIU. The
agreement to supply the seamen would be a part of the
so-called collective agreement.
OPERATOR'S UNDERSTANDING OF OPERATION
The Navy or the MSC, and not the private cotpanies,




If it is a fact that currently seamen do not possess
the necessary skills needed in support activities, it
would be overccme through the establishment of the
proposed training program. The unions are discussing the
establishment of needed training courses at their training
facilities.
CCNIINUITY OF CREW
The unions are agreeing to discuss with the operating
agency proposals that would provide continuity of




No written response was provided. During several follow-up
telephone conversations, a spokesman indicated that although the overall
concept of civilian contract manning was good, the Transportation
Institute declined to respond to the questions. The Institute was
concerned about the questions asked, and their tone, and believed that
they were in areas that were the perogative of labor, not management.
The Institute also declined to state this position in writing.
4. Maritime Institute of Research and Industrial Developanent
(MIEAID)
No written response was provided. After several follow-up
telephone calls, a representative stated that the workload of the staff
did not allov time for responding. No further connent was made.
C. RESPONSES FRCM SHIPPING ORGANIZATIONS
Three shipping organizations were requested to participate in the
survey. Two written responses were received.
1. Council of American-Flag Ship Operators (CASO)
This organization did not respond to the questionnaire because
CASO does not represent any of its member ccrapanies in collective
bargaining matters. As a result, CASO has no policy statanents to make
regarding many of the questions. Mr. Albert E. May, executive director
of CASO, wrote that the Board of Directors supported contract manning of
ships engaged in point-to-point transportation of supplies and equipnent
and certain other vessels not directly engaged in fleet sij^port
operations. CASO's letter response is contained in Appendix B.
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2. America Institute of Merchant Shipping (AIMS)
This organization indicated that it was unable to respond to the
questionnaire. AIM's letter response is contained in Appendix B.
3. Maritime Service Ccmnittee
No written response was provided. After several follow-up
telephone calls, a representative stated that the workload of the staff
did not allow time for responding. No further canment was made.
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VII. SUMMARY, CQNCLUSIQNS AND RECOVIMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The number of seagoing jobs and maritime union niembership are in a
decline. The unions are looking for more jobs at sea and have targeted
Navy fleet support ships for civilian contract manning. The Navy has
resisted this proposal because it is concerned about the costs, the
potential for disruption of operations, and the loss of command and
control. The purpose of this thesis was to focus on the non-cost
specifics of the civilian contract manning proposal and to provide the
unions with an opportunity to discuss the irrplementation of the pro-
posal.
B. COCLUSIONS
1. The maritime unions have had a history of fierce and bitter
rivalry'. When threatened as a vtole, maritime labor can cone together
to battle a comiDn enemy. Once the problem is resolved, the old
rivalries surface and corpetition for jobs becanes the predoninant
behavior of maritime labor.
2. The union proposal for civilian contract manning of fleet
support ships appears to be the answer to the question of how can more
seagoing jobs be created for union menbers. The need for Navy coimand
and control is acknowledged but is not given primary importance.
3. The Navy remains unconvinced that the benefits of civilian
contract manning will outweigh the losses it will experience. Due to
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the nature of management-labor relations in the past, civilian contract
manning presents an unacceptable risk to the Navy.
4. Civilian contract manning assumes that the Navy can contract
directly to hire civilian crews. This action is currently illegal and
would require a change in law.
5. Previous studies have examined the concept of civilian contract
manning. The areas of command and control have been recognized as
problems to be resolved if the concept is to work.
6. The unions' responses to questions regarding inpleinentation of
civilian contract manning appear to be too general in nature. For
exaitple, the concept of having a pool of trained and available seamen
for fleet support ships will have an impact on union hiring hall
procedures. When asked specifically vdiat changes will occur, none were
provided.
7. Maritime unions, with the exception of the NMEBA and NMU, did
not use this opportionity to make their positions and supporting argu-
ments known.
8. The shipping organizations' responses indicate that they
consider civilian contract manning of fleet support ships a labor
initiative. Apparently, they do not have a preference for this alter-
native manning proposal.
C. RBCCMMENDATIONS
1. That the Navy maintain its present manning policies; that it
continue to man MSC ships with Civil Service mariners to ensure
necessary canivand and control; that it continue to man Navy fleet
support ships with uniformed personnel who are trained and capable.
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2. That the Navy, through the MSC, continue to conduct inves-
tigation of civilian contract manning but that specifics attempt to be
addressed through fuirther discussion with the maritime unions.
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRES AND COVER LETTERS




The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain your organization's
views and recommendations regarding the proposal that all Navy fleet
support ships, including the Military Sealift Ccmnand ships, be civilian
contract manned. To ensure that the Navy continues to have ccmrand and
control of these fleet support ships, the proposal includes the
following stipulations:
(1) Contract operated or crewed support ships would remain under
direct Navy and Military Sealift Comiand operational control.
(2) Contract crew members would be formed into a special pool (as
distinct frcm normal union hiring halls) that would be available for
service, trained in fleet support work, and security-cleared where
required.
(3) The unions involved would agree to binding no-strike guaran-
tees.
(4) Contract crew members could agree to become members of the
Navy's active reserve, available for imnediate call-up.
(5) Where required for particularly sensitive military operations,
a Navy officer could be the ship's captain.
(6) Where required, contract manned ships could have a military
detachment on board for defense or conmunications
.
Each addressee is requested to consider the above proposal and to
answer the questions listed on the following pages.




1. What is your organization's overall reaction to the proposal?
2. What is your reaction to the concept of a special pool of union
meanbers, available for and trained in fleet support work and cleared for
security reasons?
3. How would union members be selected for service in this special
pool?
4. Hew would this selection process inpact on current union hiring hall
rules?
5. What specific procedures would be adopted in union hiring hall rules
to accaimodate this special pool?
6. Do you believe that unions would be able to ensure crew continuity?
If so, please be specific in describing how this continuity would be
accorplished.
7. Hew would unions gioarantee no-strikes or job actions?
8. What action is seen if a particular union must give up crewing a
ship due to contract re-negotiation?
9. Would unions honor shoreside picket lines in ports?
10. Hew would disciplinary problems, such as on-duty and off-dut^
misconduct, be handled?
11. Would your reaction to this proposal change as a result of peace-
time, contingency, or wartime conditions?
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATIOJ.
PLEASE RETURN THIS COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE STAMPED,
SELF-ADDRESSED ENVELOPE THAT IS PROVIDED.
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Mr. Thomas W. Scoville
Joint Maritime Congress (JMC)







As we discussed by telephone yesterday, I am currently pursuing
a master's degree at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
in the field of Transportation Management. I am presently collecting
research data for my master's thesis on the subject of contract manning
of Navy fleet support ships. The purpose of this research effort is to
obtain the views and recommendations of various portions of the maritime
industry regarding the command and control problems in contract manning.
My approach to this study is to request the completion of the en-
closed questionnaire by several maritime trade associations and labor
organizations. The completion of the questionnaire is extremely impor-
tant and is "^ery beneficial in providing the current policies and
positions of the maritime industry on the subject of contract manning. •
I hope you have a pleasant trip to Portugal, and I will be looking
for the completed questionnaire after your return on 16 October. A
stamped, self-addressed envelope is provided for your convenience.







Mr. Julian Singman, President
Maritime Institute of Research
& Industrial Development (MIRAID)
1133-15th Street, NW— Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005
Dear Mr. Singman:
As we discussed by telephone today, I am currently pursuing a mas-
ter's degree at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in
the field of Transportation Management. I am presently collecting research
data for my master's thesis on the subject of contract manning of Navy
fleet support ships. The purpose of this research effort is to obtain
the views and recommendations of various portions of the maritime industry
regarding the command and control problems in contract manning.
My approach to this study is to request the completion of the en-
closed questionnaire by several maritime trade associations and labor
organizations. The completion of the questionnaire is extremely impor-
tant and is yery beneficial in providing the current policies and
positions of the maritime industry on the subject of contract manning.
It is requested that the completed questionnaire be returned no
later than 14 October 1983. A stamped, self-addressed envelope is pro-
vided for your convenience.
Your assistance in the completion and early return of the question-









Camp Springs, Maryland 20746
Dear Mr. Evans:
As we discussed by telephone today, I am currently pursuing a mas-
ter's degree at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in
the field of Transportation Management. I am presently collecting research
data for my master's thesis on the subject of contract manning of Navy
fleet support ships. The purpose of this research effort is to obtain
the views and recommendations of various portions of the maritime industry
regarding the command and control problems in contract manning.
My approach to this study is to request the completion of the en-
closed questionnaire by several maritime trade associations and labor
organizations. The completion of the questionnaire is extremely impor-
tant and is yery beneficial in providing the current policies and
positions of the maritime industry on the subject of contract manning.
It is requested that the completed questionnaire be returned no
later than 14 October 1983. A stamped, self-addressed envelope is pro-
vided for your convenience.
Your assistance in the completion and early return of the question-











100 Indiana Avenue, NW—Suite 301
Washington, D.C. 20001
Dear Mr. Simpkins:
As we discussed by telephone today, I am currently pursuing a mas-
ter's degree at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in
the field of Transportation Management. I am presently collecting research
data for my master's thesis on the subject of contract manning of Navy
fleet support ships. The purpose of this research effort is to obtain
the views and recommendations of various portions of the maritime industry
regarding the command and control problems in contract manning.
My approach to this study is to request the completion of the en-
closed questionnaire by several maritime trade associations and labor
organizations. The completion of the questionnaire is extremely impor-
tant and is very beneficial in providing the current policies and
positions of the maritime industry on the subject of contract manning.
It is requested that the completed questionnaire be returned no
later than 14 October 1983. A stamped, self-addressed envelope is pro-
vided for your convenience.
Your assistance in the completion and early return of the question-
naire is greatly appreciated.
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QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO SHIPPING ORGANIZATIONS
The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain your organization '
s
view and recomnendations regarding the proposal that all Navy fleet
support, ships, including the Military Sealift Ccannand ships, be civilian
contract manned. To ensure that the Navy continues to have comnand and
control of these fleet support ships, the proposal includes the
following stipulations:
(1) Contract operated or crewed support ships would ranain under
direct Navy and Military Sealift Ccmmand operational control.
(2) Contract crew members would be formed into a special pool (as
distinct fron normal union hiring halls) that \>rould be available for
service, trained in fleet support work, and security-cleared where
required.
(3) The unions involved would agree to binding no-strike guaran-
(4) Contract crew monbers could agree to beccme members of the
Navy's active reserve, available for inmediate call-up.
(5) Where required, contract manned ships could have a military
detachment on board for defense or corniunications
.
Each addressee is requested to consider the above proposal and to
answer the questions listed on the following pages.




1. What is your organization's overall reaction to the proposal?
2. What is your reaction to the proposal that the ship's captain be a
USN officer?
3. What is your reaction to having a military detachment on board for
defense and cotinunications?
4. What is your reaction to the no-strike or job action stipulation?
5. Would your organization be interested in buying govemmsnt ships and
operating them for the Navy?
6. Would your organization be interested in leasing government ships
and operating them for the Navy?
TEiANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.
PLEASE RETURN THE COyiPLEnrED QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE STAMPED, SELF-ADDRESSED







Admiral James L. Holljway, III
President, Council of American Flag
Ship Operators (CASO)
1627 K Street. NW—Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Admiral Holloway:
As your secretary and I discussed today by telephone, I am currently
pursuing a master's degree at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, in the field of Transportation Management. I am presently
collecting research data for my master's thesis on the subject of contract
manning of Navy fleet support ships. The purpose of this research effort
is to obtain the views and recommendations of various portions of the
maritime industry regarding the command and control problems in contract
manning.
My approach to this study is to request the completion of the en-
closed questionnaire by several maritime trade associations and labor
organizations. The completion of the questionn'bire is extremely impor-
tant and is very beneficial in providing the current policies and
positions of the maritime industry on the subject of contract manning.
It is requested that the completed questionnaire be returned no
later than 14 October 1983. A stamped, self-addressed envelope is pro-
vided for your convenience.
Your assistance in the completion and early return of the question-






Rear Admiral W. M. Benkert, USCG (Ret.)
President, American Institute of
Merchant Shipping (AIMS)
1625 K Street, NW—Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Admiral Benkert:
As Ms. Beth Kullally and I discussed by telephone today, I am cur-
rently pursuing a master's degree at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, in the field of Transportation Management. I am
presently collecting research data for my master's thesis on the subject
of contract manning of Navy fleet support ships. The purpose of this
research effort is to obtain the views and recommendations of various
pc-tions of the maritime industry regarding the command and control
problems in contract manning.
My approach to this study is to request the completion of the en-
closed questionnaire by several maritime trade associations and labor
organizations. The completion* of the questionnaire is extremely impor-
tant and is very beneficial in providing the current policies and
positions of the maritime industry on the subject of contract manning.
Ms. Mull ally advises me that you will be out of town until 11
October, so I will be looking for the completed questionnaire a week or
two after your return. A stamped, self-addressed envelope is provided
for your convenience.
Your assistance in the completion and early return of the question-







Mr. Martin F. Hickey
Maritime Service Committee
11 Broadway, Room 1712
New York, Mew York 10004
Dear Mr. Hickey:
As Ms. Anne Marie Konopka and I discussed by telephone today, I am
currently pursuing a master's degree at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, in the field of Transportation Management. I am
presently collecting research data for my master's thesis on the subject
of contract manning of Navy fleet support ships. The purpose of this
research effort is to obtain the views and recommendations of various
portions of the maritime industry regarding the command and control
problems in contract manning.
My approach to this study is to request the completion of the en-
closed questionnaire by several maritime trade associations and labor
organizations. The completion of the questionnaire is extremely impor-
tant and is very beneficial in providing the cuVrent policies and
positions of the maritime industry on the subject of contract manning.
It is requested that the completed questionnaire be returned no
later than 14 October 1983. A stamped, self-addressed envelope is pro-
vided for your convenience.
Your assistance in the completion and early return of the question-
naire is greatly appreciated.
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Coinmander Mary L. Franzia
Naval Postgraduate School
SMC #1477
Monterey, California 9 394 3
Dear Commander Franzia:
Enclosed is your questionnaire regarding contract manning
with our answers to each of your questions. I emphasize the
word "our", because I went over each question with Mr. Jesse M.
Calhoon, President of the National Marine Engineers' Beneficial
Association, and the answers should be taken as his speaking as
President of the union. That should give them added significance
for your study.
Please do not hesitate to let me know if I can help out in
any way. We'd be interested in seeing the final study when it's






THE VOICE OF MARITIME LABOR
lOO INDIANA AVENUE. N.W.. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 • ( 202 ) 347-5980
November 1, 1983






Attached is a copy of our statement before the Subcommittee
on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials of the House
Armed Services Committee. In this testimony we addressed the
issues raised in your questionnaire. If you have any questions
after you have read this proposal, please let me know.
Also attached for your information is an article which








Admiral Holloway, who is travelling, has asked me to
respond to your letter of September 23rd requesting that
CASO complete a questionaire on the subject of contract
manning of Navy fleet support ships.
CASO does not represent any of its member companies
in collective bargaining matters, and accordingly, we do
not have a policy with regard to a number of the questions
which you have asked. I can advise you that the CASO
Board of Directors supports contract manning of ships
engaged in point-to-point transportation of supplies and
equipment and certain other vessels not directly engaged
in fleet support operations. With regard to your other
questions, we believe that they should best be answered by
our individual member companies.
With best wishes for successful completion of your
master ' s thesi s
,
\/
— ., M «. oi^pI V . ^_^

AMERICAiN INSTITUTE OF MERCHANT SHIPPLNG
October 27, 1983
Mary L. Franzia





Our President, RAdm. Benkert , has reviewed your ques-
tionnaire on the contract manning of Navy fleet support
ships and unfortunately is unable to respond to your questions
on behalf of our association. However, if you would like
his personal opinions regarding command and control problems
in contract manning, he would be more than happy to discuss
the issue with you by telephone.
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